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ABSTRACT: Road schemes are of major importance in the global PPP market. We
focus on Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) arrangements covered by shadow toll
or availability payment mechanisms, where the UK and Spain are key players. Now
that a good number of DBFO schemes in the UK and Spain have been operational
for well over half the contract period, there is scope for a detailed ex post evaluation
of DBFO performance in both countries and an analysis of how the DBFO model has
evolved. Preliminary results show that these contracts continue to be very expensive
for public administrations, especially in the UK, where the financing costs and fee per
kilometre are high. On the other hand, they are an easy source of revenue for the parent
companies of the concessionaires, where the increased use of subordinated debt rather
than equity seeks to reduce risk. However, despite circumventing the controversial hard-
tolling, some projects in both Spain and the UK present poor outcomes. Several other
problems around these projects are identified, including lack of public accountability
and transparency or poor governance, raising long-term questions around affordability
and opportunities for further study.
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1 Introduction
Using private finance to provide public infrastructure and services traditionally funded
and provided by public administrations is now a widespread practice. Since 1990, within
Europe alone, around 1,860 Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects with an estimated
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value of €369 billion have been signed (EPEC, various years). Transport infrastructure
is a significant element of PPPs, with roads playing an important part. Toll roads have
been the largest area of growth, however Design-Build-Finance-Operate-(Maintain)
(DBFO(M)) arrangements have also been used for roads projects where for political
or practical reasons direct user tolling has not been seen as appropriate. DBFO(M) ar-
rangements include shadow tolls, where the state pays the private operator an amount
per vehicle travelling on the road, plus other forms of operating and maintenance con-
tracts where payments are based on availability and active road management.
Within the DBFO(M) form of PPP projects the UK and Spain have been prominent
alongside other countries including Portugal and Canada. The UK was an early adopter
of shadow toll schemes, with nine schemes starting in the 1990s, and Spain imitated
its model. As a good number of DBFO schemes in both countries have been operational
for well over half the contract period, there is scope for a detailed comparison of DBFO
performance in both countries and an analysis of how the DBFO model has evolved.
Using the information gathered from UK and Spanish DBFO schemes, the objective of
this paper is an ex post evaluation of the financial performance of the DBFO model since
it was implemented in both countries, with empirical evidence aimed at addressing the
following key questions:
- What are the institutional differences/similarities between both countries and how
have they affected financial performance?
- Have some stakeholders benefited to a greater extent than others?
- What wider lessons can be learned?
Preliminary results show that these contracts continue to be very expensive for
public administrations, especially in the UK, where the financing costs and fee per
kilometre are high. On the other hand, they are an easy source of revenue for the
parent companies, where the increased use of subordinated debt rather than equity
seeks to reduce risk. However, some projects present poor outcomes, because, whilst
they may appear to be well designed, location and/or forecast traffic volume may be
poor. National characteristics are also important and can influence project performance
and we consider the role of stakeholder management in relation to the DBFO policy.
We identify a range of problems in evaluating the projects, including a lack of both ex
ante and ex post transparency, and areas where additional costs are being incurred
that contradict the rationale that using private finance will result in more efficient and
cost-effective delivery and operations of projects. Nevertheless, the advantage of these
projects is that the roads are freely available for all road users.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background and review
of the literature on DBFO roads. Section 3 sets out the history and development of DBFO
roads in the UK and Spain. Section 4 explains the methodology and research design.
Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 discusses the results and Section 7 draws out
the main conclusions.
2 Background and literature review
Transportation infrastructure has been the leading sector in which PPP has
grown. According to the European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC), since 1990, 1,100
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transportation projects with a value of €282.2 billion have been implemented in Europe,
more than half of all PPP projects launched and more than 75 per cent of their value
respectively. Within the transportation infrastructure sector, roads are also a testing
ground in which governments have experimented with PPP. PPP toll roads are common
world-wide, and have been relatively well studied (Acerete et al. 2009; Albalate et al.
2009; Baeza and Vassalloo 2010; Vasallo et al. 2011; Liyanage and Villalba-Romero 2015;
Romboutsos 2016; World Bank 2017). Toll roads are examples of economic PPPs, which
seek to deliver self-financing infrastructure projects. Less attention has been given to
Long-Term Infrastructure Contracts (LTICs) such as DBFO road schemes, where the
private sector builds or refurbishes the infrastructure and then operates and maintains
it in return for government payments, whilst road users make no direct payments. These
are examples of social infrastructure projects, that is, along with hospitals and schools,
infrastructure which is regarded as a necessary part of the basic social welfare that
should be delivered by the state.
Discussion of DBFO ex post operating performance in the PPP literature has been
limited, with the only empirical evaluation of the financial performance of DBFO, being
Shaoul et al. (2006), which found the cost to the public sector of using private finance
to be very high over the first few years of operation. It is still not possible to examine
whether these schemes deliver value for money for the public sector. Shaoul et al. (2006)
noted there was no yardstick against which to measure value for money, as the cost
of equivalent ex post public provision is not available. More recently the UK Public
Accounts Committee (PAC, 2018) found it ‘unacceptable’ that after 25 years the UK
Treasury still lacks data to show whether or not projects show value for money. There
is a similar lack of any robust Spanish data.
Previous comparisons between the UK and Spanish operational performance of
PPP roads have been limited and have not examined Spanish DBFO schemes (see for
example Acerete et al. 2010) or the more recent UK schemes using availability payment
mechanisms. Therefore, despite longstanding calls for better evaluation (Hodge and
Greve 2007) there is still a lack of good and robust data and scheme evaluation (Verhoest
et al. 2016). It is particularly notable that Spain was missing from Akintoye et al.’s
(2016) global review of PPPs, although a number of relevant case studies feature in the
publications coming out of the five-year COST Action TU 1001: PPPs in Transport study
of 20 European countries (Roumboutsos 2016).
Two government payment mechanisms exist for DBFO roads projects, depending
on how demand risk, that is, the number of vehicles using the road, is managed (Iossa
2015). Under the shadow toll payment mechanism, demand risk should transfer to the
private operator as the public sector makes direct payments to the concessionaire based
on the volume of traffic using the road. Under the availability payment mechanism,
demand risk remains with the public sector and the concessionaire is paid for making
the road available for public use. Contracts agreed under both mechanisms may have
additional components, for example, shadow toll contracts often have a penalty element
for substandard performance, whilst availability mechanisms may include incentives
based on volume of traffic.
The UK began a DBFO programme using a shadow toll mechanism (Shaoul et al.,
2006), with the first contract signed in 1996. This programme sought to solve the po-
litically controversial problem of hard-tolling by providing what were badged as value
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Figure 1 – Length of DBFO road schemes network in the UK and Spain.
Source: Own elaborated based on Spanish concessionaires’ notes to the annual accounts and UK Treasury PFI
spreadsheet.
for money contracts where the taxpayers rather than direct users paid the usage costs.
Although Spain had a long experience with direct toll roads, it mimicked the UK shadow
toll model a few years later in 1999, overtaking the UK in 2012 in terms of the number of
kilometres of shadow toll schemes (see Figure 1). A small number of other countries have
experimented with shadow toll roads programmes. Portugal contracted seven shadow
toll schemes between 1999 and 2001 as part of its intensive expansion of its highways
network. However between 2008 and 2010, the payments for these shadow toll roads
doubled from €400 million to nearly €900 million (DGTF 2012). Given that Portugal was
forced to apply for IMF bailout as a result of the financial crisis, this financing model
was not sustainable (Cruz et al. 2015). Instead the schemes were converted to direct
toll roads, with revenue going to the public sector which pays the concessionaires on the
basis of an availability mechanism. Information on any other shadow toll schemes is
sparse – Iossa (2015) reports that Finland has examples but gives no details. Liyanage
et al. (2016) provides a brief case study of the Belgian Via-Invest Zaventem shadow toll
project), finding that the cost of the project exceeded the budget, there are poor monitor-
ing mechanisms and there is a lack of financial benefits for users. They do not report on
the operating financial performance.
The UK also uses the availability payment mechanism, as well as having two con-
tracts using a performance mechanism (known as Active Management). More countries
have adopted the availability payment form of DBFO/DBFOM project, with examples in
Canada, the US, Ireland (seven), the Netherlands and Australia amongst others.
Abdel (2007) provides an early overview of six Canadian DBFOM projects which
included three roads. These projects contain a mixture of different types of payment
mechanism, where, although the majority element is for availability there are adjust-
ments for usage, safety, user satisfaction and quality amongst others. Some projects also
include a capital payment. Although no overall evaluation is made, conclusions suggest
that hybrid mechanisms including capital payments may offer the best outcome. Over
the past decade the US has become interested in using PPPs to save cost on highway
maintenance and refurbishment of its transport infrastructure. Two quantitative stud-
ies (Anastasopoulos et al. 2014; Nahidi et al. 2017) find a large number of factors are
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important in determining accurate costs at the planning stage, including project cost,
size, duration and length, and call for further systematic work to identify what PPP
models would best suit which type of projects.
Villalba-Romero and Liyanage (2015) provide a fuller qualitative case study of
UK’s M80 Haag Stepps Road and A19 Dishford Road, along with a study of the M25,
in a paper comparing different payment mechanisms. They find that while there are
benefits and drawbacks to each method, and that careful specification is needed, they
are all useful. They suggest further study is needed to see if hybrid financing methods
are appropriate.
3 UK and Spanish DBFO schemes
3.1 Organisational structure
In the UK, the DBFO company is a special purpose vehicle (SPV) whose sharehold-
ers are typically a construction company and one or more finance entities. Shareholders
tend to be large international groups although there are some exceptions. In recent years
a secondary market has developed for selling stakes in the SPV to private equity compa-
nies. The DBFO contract provides the SPV with its sole source of income that arises from
the relevant payment mechanism: volume traffic basis (shadow toll), availability basis
or active management. It must be highlighted that unlike the Spanish concessionaires
the UK SPV is a shell company employing no staff. This corporate structure serves to
isolate the SPV’s risk, by enabling it to walk away from financial problems, while at
the same time creating additional sources of profit for the parent companies (Acerete
et al. 2010). All operations are carried out by the staff of related party companies. Par-
ent companies include construction companies and financiers, and it is not possible to
track profits through the web of related party companies, as construction, operation and
maintenance activities are subcontracted out by the SPV, each activity having its own
profit stream (Shaoul et al. 2010).
The Spanish concessionaires are subsidiaries (around 80% of the share capital)
of the major Spanish construction and infrastructure construction-management com-
panies that are world leaders in developing transportation concessions.1 Traditionally
these companies have been successful in delivering good returns to investors through
their integration of construction, concession and investor functions in a single company
(Carpintero 2011). The remaining percentage is held by local construction companies
as, unlike the Spanish hard-toll motorways, these are projects of regional interest. Like
their UK counterparts however, more recently construction companies have been selling
their interests to international investment funds. Public administrations do not appear
formally as shareholders of these concessionaires, but, when some of them were set up,
part of the initial contribution of shareholders came from savings banks in which, until
the recent reform of the Spanish bank sector, the autonomous regional governments had
political control (Ysa et al. 2012; Garcı́a-Cestona and Surroca 2008; Grifell-Tatjé 2011).
1 According to the latest Public Works Financing ranking of ‘World’s Largest Transportation
Developers’ all these 6 parent companies are within the top 12 positions.
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The concessionaires’ only revenue is the income derived from the shadow tolls
generated on a traffic volume basis. Spanish shadow toll concessionaires employ some
275 workers as administrative staff, technical staff and managers.
3.2 Legal framework
Within the UK’s common law tradition, contract law, involving the informed con-
sent of both parties, plays an important role. Whilst early UK PFI projects suffered
due to poor contract specification by the public sector (Edwards et al. 2004), the UK
Treasury has since adopted Standard Contracts which, although very lengthy, serve to
protect public and private sector partners alike. These contain variation mechanisms to
allow for changes to the contract, which at the same time ensure that the equity return
on which the contract was bid is protected. Renegotiation is therefore possible; however
as both parties have to agree to changes it has been costly to the public sector (Edwards
et al. 2004; NAO 2008). The UK response to high costs on DBFO projects has been to
move from shadow toll contracts, where the public sector had no control over costs in the
face of increasing traffic volumes, to availability payment mechanisms where demand
risk remains with the public sector and the contract is therefore cheaper.
In contrast, Spain’s Napoleonic-code-law regime leads to a government-driven
system (Arnedo et al. 2008). Spanish (shadow) toll road legislation is governed by Ley
8/1972 de construcción, conservación y explotación de autopistas de peaje en régimen
de concesión, if the public grantor modifies the project unilaterally, the concessionaire
must be compensated to maintain the economic and financial balance. In addition, in
accordance with the legislation concerning public sector contracts, concessionaires have
the right to maintain the economic balance of the contract due to other circumstances,
although these are not specified and depend on the terms included in the specific ad-
ministrative clauses of the contract. As a result, 14 out of the 26 projects have modified
their initial terms of contracts and 5 more have requested to do so.
Advantages awarded to concessionaires to maintain the economic-financial bal-
ance of the contract due to increases in investment works, compulsory purchases or
delays in execution of works, regardless who, public administration or private operator,
is responsible for them, are in the form of extension of the period of concession (3 projects)
or modification (increase) of fees and toll bands (6 projects). But, the most widely used
compensation has been the awarding of direct grants to concessionaires (15 projects),
totalling some €386 million. In fact, five different grants have been awarded to the same
project for different reasons, such as: increase in construction costs, compensation for
the delay in coming into service, higher value of expropriations (twice) and to increase
the IRR of the project. Besides, the average elapsed time since the signature of the con-
tract for re-establishing its economic-financial balance is 4 years and 3 months, but, the
average elapsed time reduces to 1 year and 4 months if we consider the date of opening
of the road. The outcome is that this is very costly to the public administrations.
3.3 Financing
As to be expected with project financing, Table 3 shows the very high level of
gearing for these DBFO contracts, rising from 93.1 to 98.7 per cent for the UK between
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Figure 2 – Sources of finance. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source: Own elaborated based on concessionaires’ notes to the annual accounts. The figure at the end of the
line is the average for the corresponding magnitude.
1999 and 2014, and from 83 per cent in 2002 to 86.3 per cent in 2014 for Spain. The
main source of financing is third-party loans, as shown in Figure 2, with Spain showing a
slightly higher average at 76.6 per cent than the UK’s 68.1 per cent. What is interesting
is the movement over time in loans from related parties. Whilst these have always
been a substantial percentage for the UK, averaging 25.9 per cent, in Spain these have
risen dramatically from zero at the start to 14.4 per cent in 2014, overtaking equity
capital to become the second source of finance in 2013. This related-party financing
comes mainly from subordinated debt borrowed by the parent company at a higher rate
of interest than third-party debt due to its more risky nature. However Spain’s equity
capital proportion (15.7% on average) continues to be much higher than the UK, where
share capital has always had a residual role in financing DBFO schemes, averaging 2.3
per cent over the period. Table 4 shows the breakdown of sources of finance for 2014.
This historic difference in how projects are financed makes the comparison of stakeholder
risk between the two countries analytically complex. It is notable however that following
the banking and finance reforms in Spain, project finance is moving more towards the
UK model where financiers seek to limit their risk through a variety of mechanisms,
including transferring risk to sub-contractors or to the public sector, and spreading risk
through activities including insurance, syndication and hedging (Demirag et al. 2011).
The financial crisis had a further impact on financing, as financiers became more risk
averse, leading to increased equity stakes in the UK as a consequence (Demirag et al.
2011), and in Spain to more regional government grants to concessionaires.
3.4 Economic performance
The UK presents a patchy position. Whilst most contracts have been very profitable
for the operators, with 70 per cent paying dividends so far, three have had losses in all
the years in operation. whilst another has become profitable but has not yet compensated
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brought forward losses. Spain’s overall performance, unsurprisingly given the impact of
the financial crisis at a key point when many contracts were becoming operational, is
much worse. Only eight concessionaires have paid dividends (30%), all but one of these
being open to traffic before the economic crisis arose. The same number, eight out of the
sample (30%), have had losses throughout all the years they have been open to traffic
and four more have not yet compensated for the accumulated brought forward losses
(15%). Overall therefore, there is distinctive difference between the UK and Spain. The
UK SPVs have on the whole delivered solid returns to their investors and financiers,
whilst the Spanish companies have proved to be far riskier operations for their investors,
although as later sections show there has been significant government support that has
been beneficial to these stakeholders.
4 Research design
Our aim is to carry out an ex post longitudinal comparative evaluation of UK and
Spanish DBFO projects. Consequently we compare two groups of companies: UK DBFO
road-operators and Spanish shadow toll-road operators. The sample is made up of the
19 UK and 26 Spanish concessionaires listed in Tables 1 and 2.
For UK DBFO companies we obtained the annual accounts from Companies House
for the period 1999–2014, when the first roads had entered a steady state position. Sim-
ilarly we accessed the Spanish concessionaires’ annual accounts in the Registrar of
Companies for 1999–2014, although we have analysed only data since the first complete
year in which the first roads were open to traffic (2002). It was not possible to collect
data from the public sector partner for either jurisdiction. In the UK this information
is aggregated across contracts (Shaoul et al. 2010). In Spain the absence of a public
unit, in which the information about these projects (annual payments, contract mod-
ifications, etc.) is centralised must be noted. Information about Spanish shadow toll
projects is scattered in official regional gazettes, in the news or in reports of Spanish
regional audit offices that normally are issued several years later than the period of
performance under investigation; information is thus fragmented and not consistently
provided.
We aggregate the concessionaires’ financial data for each of the Spanish and the
UK DBFO concessions. Given that the amount of payments from the public adminis-
trations is not available, we use the turnover given in the Income Statement of DBFO
concessionaires. This figure is important because it allows us to see the scale of public
money taken up by the DBFO schemes in total.
We split providers of finance into ‘third party’ and ‘related-party’ because parent
companies and other related-party entities are increasingly not a marginal but a growing
and relevant source of finance. As regards resources for financing the investment of
concessionaires in the underlying asset we have only considered long-term resources
for two reasons: firstly, to keep with the ‘golden rule’ of investment that states that
long-term investments must be financed with long-term resources, so the demand of
money for paying them back and the interests is in accordance with the realisation
period of assets, secondly, because the short-term resources are immaterial in that they
only represent 3 per cent of funds.
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ENGLAND 2000-07-11 30 230.4 24 Availability
UK Highways A55 WALES 2001-03-16 100 40 Volume of
traffic









SCOTLAND 2005-05-02 30 135 16.4 Availability




ENGLAND 2006-07-01 30 73 30 Active man-
agement




ENGLAND 2011-08-10 30 60.1 8.3 Availability
M80 Stepps to
Haggs
SCOTLAND 2011-09-09 31 320 18 Availability
Source: UK HM Treasury PFI Current Projects Spreadsheet available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/private-finance-initiative-and-private-finance-2-projects-2017-summary-data
In Spanish companies, the financial expenses payable to third party finance
providers interests include both financial expenses taken to the Income Statement and
capitalised interests that have accrued but where recognition in the Income Statement
can be deferred, according to the specific variation of the Spanish General Accounting
Plan for the concession sector (Stafford et al. 2010). Also in Spain, the annual allocation
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Murcia 2001-12-10 25 96.3 62.2
RUTA DE LOS
PANTANOS
Madrid 2002-09-27 25 69.9 159
TRADOS 45 Madrid 2002-03-14 25 (extended 51
months)
190.9 14.5

















2006-05-01 25-30 200.1 74.5
AUTOVÍA DEL
CAMINO
Navarre 2006-06-30 30 354.6 72
PALMA-
MANACOR




MADRID 407 Madrid 2007-05-03 30 70.3 16
VIASTUR Asturias 2007-05-13 30 72.5 26.8
IBISAN. Balearic Islands 2007-06-30 30 75.6 17.5
EIXLLOBREGAT Catalonia 2008-01-01 33 311 40
SANTIAGO-
BRIÓN
Galicia 2008-02-15 30 111.1 15
REUS ALCOVER Catalonia 2008-06-13 33 80 10.2
PUENTE DEL
EBRO
Aragon 2008-07-04 30 57.2 5.2
ACCESOS DE
IBIZA
Balearic Islands 2008-07-15 25 74.9 7
AUTOVÍA DEL
TURIA
Valencia 2008-07-31 36 161.2 54
AUTOESTRADA
DO SALNES
Galicia 2008-08-23 30 53.6 17
AUTOVÍA DEL
ERESMA
Castile and León 2008-09-19 35 101.8 113
AUTOVÍA DE
LOS PINARES
Castile and León 2008-09-24 35 94 104.6
AUTOVÍA DEL
BARBANZA
Galicia 2008-12-15 30 95.7 40.1
CEDINSA D’ARO Catalonia 2008-12-31 33 88.3 27
CEDINSA TER Catalonia 2011-07-31 33 348 49
AUTOVÍA DEL
PIRINEO




Catalonia 2012-12-28 33 475 67
Source: Own elaboration based on Notes to the annual accounts of concessionaires.
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Table 3 – Gearing ratio
GEARING
RATIO 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
SP 86.3 86 86.4 85.8 84.6 84.5 84.2 83.9 82.9 82.6 83.7 82.8 83 – – –
UK 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.5 97.2 97.3 97.6 97.9 97.8 97.8 97.1 97.2 97.2 97.2 96.2 93.1
Table 4 – Sources of finance (2014)
UK SP
£million % over total capital €million % over total capital
INVESTMENT (gross) 3,295 3,556
L/T DEBTS WITH THIRD PARTY 2,160 79.6 2,748 71.9
L/T DEBTS WITH RELATED-PARTY 518 19.1 549 14.4
SHARE CAPITAL 36 1.3 525 13.7
TOTAL CAPITAL EMPLOYED 2,714 3,822
to a ‘Special Motorways Reserve’ has been added to the Dividends item, because this
reserve is specifically allocated to be used in the case that dividends paid in a year do
not reach 6 per cent of return to shareholders.
We calculate ratios showing and comparing the return to the providers of both
debt and equity. The return on debt also distinguishes between the interest paid to
third-party finance providers and to related-party entities, because DBFO arrangements
have created a finance market opportunity for parent companies, since they provide
subordinated debt to the DBFO subsidiaries. In both cases, the UK and Spain, debt
includes derivatives used by companies to reduce the cost of third-party financing. The
return for each stakeholder is measured as follows:
- Third-party finance providers  Interest paid/Long-term finance liabilities of third
parties
- Related-party finance providers  Interest paid/Long-term finance liabilities of re-
lated parties
- Shareholders  Dividends/Share capital
- Total return  (Dividends + Interest) / (Share capital + Long-term finance
liabilities)
The difference between the return on private finance and the cost of public fi-
nance allows us to understand the cost of using DBFO arrangements compared to tra-
ditional procurement. We measure the difference between the cost of private and public
finance by comparing the average return to private finance providers to the yield of a
30-year bond issued by the Spanish and the UK (30 years is the most common length of
DBFO contracts). The difference between the two approximates to the price paid for risk
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Figure 3 – Evolution of turnover in the UK and SP DBFO concessionaires. [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source: Own elaborated based on concessionaires’ notes to the annual accounts. The conversion of the
Turnover of UK companies into € is done using the official exchange rate €/£ at the balance sheet date.
transfer to the private operators, the return on finance provided also by the private
operators and the return on equity for the private operators.
In order to compare monetary data for the two countries we have chosen to present
figures in Euros, rather than UK sterling. The movement in exchange rates over the
period has led to income increases in favour of the UK DBFO concessionaires, even
though sterling depreciated up to 50% during this period. However the trend of increases
in payments by the public administrations is higher than the decrease of the currency
value.
5 Financial analysis
This section presents the results of our financial analysis. We use a graphical
presentation so that the trends and movements for both countries over the 15 year
period can easily be seen.
5.1 Analysis of DBFO concessionaires’ turnover
Although the length of the DBFO road network has been similar since 2008, and
has been longer in Spain than the UK since 2012, the overall Turnover of the DBFO
sector in the UK has been always much higher than in Spain (see Figure 3). In part this
is due to underestimation of traffic volume in the UK compared to over-estimation in
Spain (Bain 2009). Whereas the Turnover of the Spanish concessionaires have had an
steady increase throughout the period, in line with the increase of the kilometres open
to traffic, UK income increase is not linear due to the accounting treatment which sees
the asset under construction being transferred as ‘turnover’ in the income statement
when the asset reached completion. So the ‘peaks’ that appear in Figure 3 are due to the
recognition of asset construction cost as income by concessionaires of the termination
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Figure 4 – Return to DBFO finance providers (as % of the corresponding magnitude over
the corresponding finance item). [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
of the road works and its delivery to public use. The opening in 2012 of the M25, the
biggest DBFO contract in the UK, hugely distorts the data of the latest years of the
sample period, because it represents more than 34 per cent of the total investment in
UK DBFO roads.
5.2 Return on investment to stakeholders
Figure 4 shows the return on investment to stakeholders. For Spanish concessions,
the shareholders are the clear winners, with an average return of 10.7 per cent, followed
by related-party finance providers with 5.2 per cent and third-party finance providers
with 4.6 per cent. However the returns to shareholders show a continuous decrease over
time, due to the increase of the total share capital as new concessionaires join the sector,
but no more concessionaires pay dividends. Since 2007 the returns to related-party
providers have superseded the returns to external finance providers.
As already noted, the UK’s shareholders contribute little resources in financing the
investment, but they obtain a high return on their investment, for instance an average
return of 67.8 per cent, reaching a peak of 157 per cent in 2014. In Spain, related-party
finance providers have obtained an average return that is also higher than third-party
finance providers, 10.9 per cent vs. 7.4 per cent. In percentage and absolute terms, the
returns to DBFO stakeholders are much higher in all the groups in the UK than in
Spain, especially in the case of shareholders.
5.3 Comparison between private and public finance cost in DBFOs
As expected, Figure 5 shows the cost of private finance for Spanish DBFO schemes
to be more expensive than the equivalent finance provided by public administrations,
5.5 per cent vs. 5.1 per cent. But during years 2010, 2011 and 2012 the cost of public
debt was nearly equal or even higher than the cost of private finance resources. The
reason for this apparent failure to comply with economic theory is that during these
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Figure 5 – Private and public finance cost of DBFO projects. [Colour figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
years, Spain was on the verge of being rescued, in fact several Spanish banks were
placed in administration and the risk premium paid by Spanish public administration
was over 600 basic points (it has since fallen to around 100 basic points), so it was not
impossible that under these conditions public debt continued being cheaper than private
finance.
The average cost of private finance for UK DBFO schemes in the period 1999–2014
is more than twice higher than the equivalent finance provided by public administra-
tions, 9 per cent vs. 4 per cent. While private finance cost follows a slight upward trend,
the public debt cost follows a downward trend, so difference in cost of the two sources
of finance seems set to diverge still further in the near future. If we compare the total
percentage of return to finance providers, we can see that the UK return is 3.5 per cent
percentage points (about 40%) higher in the UK than in Spain (see Figure 5). Private
finance is more expensive in the UK than in Spain, whereas public cost of financing has
been slightly cheaper in the UK than in Spain.
6 Discussion
We examine a number of issues and limitations that arise from our evaluation
of UK and Spanish DBFO contracts over the long term. Our analysis of financial per-
formance shows that there are some structural differences between the UK and Spain
in relation to DBFO roads contracts, making the comparison problematic. The UK fi-
nancing model from the start has been more debt-dependent than the Spanish model,
the cost of private finance has been much higher compared to the cost of public debt,
and early UK schemes in particular have been very profitable for the private sector
equity partner (Shaoul et al. 2006, 2012). In contrast Spanish schemes have had greater
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shareholder participation, and follow the concessionaire model with which Spain has
been familiar since initiating a hard toll road programme in the 1960s. Since the finan-
cial crisis however, Spain’s financing model seems to be moving more towards the UK
model, which may be as a consequence of the commercialisation of the Spanish bank-
ing system (Ysa et al. 2012, Acerete et al., 2015). Spanish financial performance has
worsened since the financial crisis, making our analysis extremely difficult due to the
extensive and long-running succession of losses being recorded.
Our empirical work highlighted a range of issues which reflect global concerns
around the use and implementation of PPP policies. First, there continues to be a lack
of transparency as to how governments make the decision to use PPPs, or particular
models of PPPs. In Spain, where there is no requirement to put forward a justification
based on a Value For Money case, several regional public audit offices have denounced
the lack of reports justifying the election of the PPP alternative. For example, in 2005
the Regional Audit Office of Madrid said:
The autonomous government has not provided any previous viability report, includ-
ing the cost of the investment to be done and the financing scheme, as well as the
justification of the chosen scheme.
A decade later we found a similar statement from the Regional Audit Office of
Andalusia:
. . . there is not any analysis or any information stating if when the decision for
choosing the concessional model as public-private partnership scheme for carrying
out new infrastructure was made, other alternative schemes were evaluated.
In the absence of official reports, the Regional Audit Office of Andalusia carried
out a simulation and the PPP alternative was significantly more expensive that the
traditional public procurement (between 70 and 83%) than the traditional public pro-
curement. It has to be noted that these figures do not include the estimated impact of
risk transfer linked with the PPP alternative or the opportunity cost of bringing together
the budgetary funds with the traditional public procurement in a few years.
In the UK, the Value for Money calculation is an important part of the government
process and must be followed. However, as noted earlier, there is still no robust evidence
from the Treasury that value for money is being achieved in practice (NAO 2018; PAC
2018). Moreover there is silence as to why and when the government changed from
using the shadow toll mechanism to the availability payment mechanism, or why a third
mechanism of active management has been introduced for a small number of roads. The
UK’s National Audit Office (NAO) has not commented on this change. More work needs
to be carried out to see if the projects using these alternative payment mechanisms are
less expensive for the public sector.
Second, Spanish projects were permitted to go ahead due to excessively op-
timistic traffic volume forecasts. For some projects actual volume has ranged from
26 per cent to 40 per cent less than the forecast. Traffic volume forecasting is well
known to be problematic in roads projects (Bain 2009), indicating that decisions to go
ahead with projects were taken for political rather than economic reasons. This is con-
sistent with earlier findings relating to UK DBFO roads where Acerete et al. (2010)
© 2018 The Authors
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics © 2018 CIRIEC
16 BASILIO ACERETE, MAR GASCA AND ANNE STAFFORD







MADRID TRADOS 45 199.2 290.7 45.9
EUROGLOSA 45 128.4 172.2 34.1
CONCESIONES DE MADRID 168 290.7 73.0
RUTA DE LOS PANTANOS 138.9 169.9 22.3
CATALONIA CEDINSA EIX LLOBREGAT 270.9 311.1 14.8
REUS-ALCOVER 61 80 31.1
CEDINSA D’ARO 85.7 88.4 3.2
CEDINSA TER 245.9 348.4 41.7
EIX TRANSVERSAL 805.6 946.2 17.5
EIX DIAGONAL 463.6 476.5 2.8
AVERAGE 28.6
quoted from DLA Piper (2004) in saying that ‘PPPs are dependent on a fourth ‘P’ –
politics’.
Third, the financial crisis had a huge impact on the cost of DBFO projects. In
the UK, the contract to widen the M25 was severely criticised by the NAO (2010). An
18-month delay due to technical issues around creating an additional lane meant that
it was finalised in May 2009 at the height of the financial crisis, thus increasing the
net present cost by £660m (24%) to £3.4bn. In Spain the financial crisis and subsequent
EU regulator implementation of tougher requirements for banks over-exposed to public
administration projects made it difficult to find providers of finance. For one example,
the Eix Diagonal, in Catalonia only two contractors were able to complete the financing
offer in the tender. The winner, ACS, expected to get financial resources that amounted
to 85 per cent of the investment, contributing the remaining 15 per cent (€18.5 million)
as equity. But, finally, equity was €160 million. In Galicia the project Costa da Morte was
designed with a length of 42 km., but the concessionaire did not found enough financing.
There was a partial termination of the contract reducing the length of the motorway to
25 km.
Fourth, although there are claims that PPPs are meant to deliver projects to
cost, large cost overruns continue to occur. The NAO (2010) reported on cost problems
in relation to the UK M25. In Spain Madrid and Catalonia have recorded on average
deviations of 28 per cent and 41 per cent in the investment in the road and expected
payments to the concessionaire, respectively (see Table 5). In Madrid projects were
signed in 1998/1999 and in Catalonia in 2003/2009, so public administrations have not
learnt how to deal with deviations by means of PPP. Furthermore, Galician shadow
toll motorways have had price modifications between 9 and 29 per cent that have been
covered with direct payments by the regional government, even though the regional
audit office uncovered that these modifications related to construction risks that the
concessionaire should bear or other matters that should have been solved before signing
the contract (Consello de Contas de Galicia 2014).
Fifth, the use of a shadow toll payment mechanism is expensive. It does not
represent value for money for the public sector, as within short time periods more than
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the full cost of the scheme is already paid, as reported by Shaoul et al. (2006) for the UK
and as shown by concessions such as the Madrid M-45 scheme2 and Navarre’s Autovı́a
del Camino scheme, both of which repay the capital cost within 10 years of opening. Even
though these figures incorporate amounts for life cycle costing, the capital payback time
seems very short. Moreover the high costs have the potential to create affordability
problems for public administration budgets. The lack of information provided, plus the
uncertainty around payments based on traffic volumes which are not known in advance,
means that total commitments are unknown. This would not happen if the infrastructure
were financed via traditional public procurement3. In addition, shadow toll payments
can weaken public administrations, because their investment capacity is diminished as
their budget is conditional on these payments. Shaoul et al. (2006) note that the high
cost of the first eight UK DBFOs creates an affordability issue for the (then) Highways
Agency. In several Spanish regions shadow toll payments take up a significant portion
of public budgets. In Asturias, the payments due to shadow toll contracts use 12.5 per
cent of the budget of the Department of Public Works. In Galicia in 2011, the use of
shadow toll represented some 38 per cent of the total investment. In Madrid, in 2011,
despite the reduction of the overall budget of expenses about 10 per cent, the payments
to shadow toll concessionaires increased 5.7 per cent with respect to the previous year.
In Navarre, in 2015, 20.8 per cent of the budget for investments was dedicated to shadow
tolls. In the Balearic Islands, the specific budget for roads in the island of Ibiza, in 2017,
commits 68 per cent for paying shadow tolls. If there are also cuts in public budgets, as is
the case in both countries due to austerity measures, then some public administrations
may struggle to pay shadow toll commitments. This issue has been particularly acute in
Spain. In Andalucı́a, two contracts were awarded, but later they were terminated due
to the difficulties of concessionaires to formalise the finance of the project and also due
to the economic situation of the Autonomous Government that anticipated affordability
problems.
Finally, as has been the case with Spanish toll roads, where the PPP policy priva-
tises the benefits and nationalises the losses (Acerete et al. 2010), a number of Spanish
shadow toll concessionaires have received extra grants or other benefits from the respec-
tive regional governments. These include Cendinsa Ter, where the regional government
of Catalonia will have to pay an additional net amount of €80 million on top of a previ-
ous assumption of debt of €220 million and equity of €55 million in 2015. Similarly the
Galician regional government rescued two concessionaires in 2008 and 2009 and in 2014
increased annual payments by €7 million, to avoid the payment of €189 million if these
companies entered into bankruptcy, due to its patrimonial responsibility. Madrid has
awarded direct grants of €81.9 million in addition to annual payments. This contrasts
with the UK position, where rising traffic volume has meant shadow toll payments
more than cover private sector operating costs. Instead in the UK the focus has been on
whether the private sector is generating excessive returns. The UK PAC (2003) found
2 Our characterisation of the M-45 as very expensive contrasts with Liyanage et al. (2016)
performance score of 83 per cent (excellent) in their study measuring success of a number of PPP
roads projects. This is because their focus is on the financial outcome for the private, rather than
the public, partner.
3 Audit report about the public private performance of the Public Works Agency of the Gov-
ernment of Andalusia, for the year 2013.
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that SPVs were generating between three and ten times as much as the perceived ‘nor-
mal’ rates of return of 8–15 per cent, whilst for the M25 it was estimated that investors’
returns from selling their stakes were over 30 per cent, that is, more than double the
expected return (NAO 2010).
In summary, our financial evaluation of shadow toll road performance in both
countries favours the providers of finance and equity shareholders at the expense of
the public sector. The public sector position has been worsened by additional costs
imposed by the financial crisis, which creates a real threat to affordability when the
position of DBFO roads is added to crises relating to PFI and PPP hospital con-
tracts. The problems of lack of transparency over policy use and operational perfor-
mance noted in previous studies (Shaoul et al. 2006; Acerete et al. 2010) continue to
exist.
7 Conclusions
Whilst DBFO roads contracts have not received the same level of attention in
the literature as toll roads, they still represent an important part of the Long Term
Infrastructure Contracts family (Hodge et al. 2010). We seek to add to our understanding
of how performance of these contracts has changed over the last ten years, whether a
better balance between stakeholder returns is present and whether there is evidence of
institutional learning from lessons raised in the past.
Whilst the UK and Spain are both leading players in DBFO contracts, there
are jurisdictional differences in the way the two states approach these contracts and
manage their PPP policy (Stafford et al. 2010). Consequently, there are differences in
organisational structure, legal framework, financing and operations. This is a limitation
for comparative study, as we are not able to compare like-with-like.
The UK has moved away from expensive shadow toll payment mechanisms to
availability payment and active management mechanisms Further study of the financial
performance of these newer contracts would be useful to put alongside case studies such
as Villalba-Romero and Liyanage (2016) to discover if and/or how there are changes in
how stakeholders’ returns are balanced. In Spain, it is striking that Spanish regional
public administrations continued to enter into shadow toll contracts for some time after
other jurisdictions had moved to alternative payment mechanisms, particularly when
one of these jurisdictions was its close neighbour Portugal, in whose DBFO projects
Spanish construction companies have a relevant participation. Further study which
draws on Norton and Blanco (2009) and Burke and Demirag (2017) in an examination
of stakeholder relations could shed further light on why Spanish regions have persisted
with shadow toll contracts.
Given the importance of roads infrastructure to economic development and the
continuing global emphasis on the use of private finance to deliver such infrastructure,
the debate continues over whether governments should use DBFO or hard toll contracts
for PPP roads projects. Having a good understanding of the operational financial per-
formance of existing contracts, the roles of the various stakeholders and the problems
posed particularly for the public sector partner is essential if future contracts are to be
affordable.
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